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ABSTRACT
Releasing connection data from social networking services
can pose a significant threat to user privacy. In our work,
we consider structural social network de-anonymization at-
tacks, which are used when a malicious party uses connec-
tions in a public or other identified network to re-identify
users in an anonymized social network release that he ob-
tained previously.
In this paper we design and evaluate a novel social de-
anonymization attack. In particular, we argue that the sim-
ilarity function used to re-identify nodes is a key component
of such attacks, and we design a novel measure tailored for
social networks. We incorporate this measure in an attack
called Bumblebee. We evaluate Bumblebee in depth, and
show that it significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art,
for example it has higher re-identification rates with high
precision, robustness against noise, and also has better er-
ror control.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The rise of social networking services has paved the way
for businesses monetizing social data; however, abuses and
malintents emerged as quickly as legal opportunities. In par-
allel, the deep integration of social networking services into
everyday life provides a never seen possibility for govern-
ments to extend their spying capabilities [4]. This asymme-
try of powers between the users versus business parties and
governments continuously urges the investigation of privacy
issues beyond positive uses of social networks.
In this paper we consider the problem how the graph
structure of a network alone can be abused to match users in
different social networks, which often leads to the violation
of user privacy. More specifically, we focus on large-scale re-
identification attacks when two large networks are aligned
together in order to de-anonymize one of them. As a result,
each node in the anonymized network is either connected to
a known identity in another network or not, meaning that
the identity of the node is revealed (or it is de-anonymized).
There is a myriad of motivations for such attacks. For
example a business party can be financially motivated in
the de-anonymization of freshly bought anonymized datasets
in order to update its previous records with the new data.
∗Corresponding author.
Meanwhile, gluing several communication networks together
can be an attractive target for government agencies (e.g.,
email and telephone communications). Beside several sucess-
ful attacks on social networks [5,13–15,19–21,27], it has also
been shown that location data can be de-anonymized with
social networks as a background knowledge [14,25].
The algorithm proposed by Narayanan and Shmatikov in
2009 (to which we refer as Nar) was the first to achieve
large-scale re-identification in social networks [19]. Their
work applied comparison of nodes based on previously dis-
covered matching of neighboring nodes, meaning that in-
stead of comparing each node in background knowledge to
all in the anonymized graph (i.e., global comparison), their
algorithm compared each node only to a smaller set of oth-
ers that had been close enough to existing mappings (lo-
cal comparison). This reduced computational complexity
of the problem significantly, thus allowing large-scale re-
identification in networks consisting of even more than a
hundred thousand nodes. The authors in their main ex-
periment re-identified 30.8% of co-existing nodes between a
Twitter (224k nodes) and a Flickr (3.3m nodes) crawl with
a relatively low error rate of 12.1%.
Let us now illustrate how the Nar attack works on a sim-
ple example. An adversary obtains datasets as depicted
in Fig. 1, a dataset of known identities that he uses as a
background knowledge (left), and an anonymized/sanitized
dataset (right). The attacker’s goal is to to learn political
preferences by structural de-anonymization. Initially, the
attacker re-identifies (or maps) some nodes that stand out
globally from the dataset (the seeding phase). In our ex-
ample, two top degree nodes are re-identified: Dave ↔ D
and Fred ↔ F – as their degrees are outstandingly high and
globally match each.
Then the attack continues by inspecting nodes related to
the ones already re-identified (the propagation phase). The
attacker picks a yet unidentified node in the background
knowledge network. Let he first pick Harry, who has two
neighbors already mapped: Dave, Fred. Nodes that could
correspond to Harry in the anonymized dataset should also
be neighbors of D and F, which are nodes A, B, C, E, G, H, and
I. In the next step, similarity of these nodes are measured to
Harry, which is calculated by dividing the number of their
common mapped neighbors with their degree. This results
a similarity score of 1 for nodes B, I; 1/
√
2 for nodes A, C, G;
2/
√
3 for node E; and 2/
√
2 for node H. As node H alone has
the highest score, the attacker selects Harry → H. However,
for precaution, the attacker uses the same technique to check
which node would be the best match (in the public dataset)
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Figure 1: Datasets for the example of de-anonymization with
an initial re-identification mapping between some nodes.
for H. If he gets Harry ← H in this case as well, the new
mapping Harry ↔ H is registered.
While the similarity metric used by Nar provides a good
balance between correct and incorrect re-identification matches,
it is biased towards low degree nodes. For instance, if the
attacker picks Ed first, he cannot re-identify him correctly:
node H would have a higher score than node E (with 2/
√
3).
Therefore we argue that selecting the right metric for com-
parison is a critical part of the algorithm, as it determines
the performance and final limits of the attack. We propose
an alternative metric, for which we show by evaluation that
it significantly improves the state-of-the-art. Our main con-
tributions are the following:
• We create a novel structural re-identification algorithm
called Bumblebee, which is based on a new similarity
metric specifically designed for the current re-identification
task. We show that improving this critical point en-
hances several properties of the attack significantly.
Parameters of Bumblebee allow a more fine-grained
control than the Nar algorithm due to the larger score
diversity.
• We evaluate the performance, robustness of Bumble-
bee and its sensitivity of initialization. We show that
Bumblebee can reach significantly higher correct de-
anonymization rates while having the same or lower
error rate as of Nar. In our experiments, we observe an
increase of 28%-50% of correct re-identifications while
error remains the same. Inversely, error rates can also
be decreased close to zero. We measured error rates
below 0.2% when having similar proportions of cor-
rect re-identification rates. We also show that Bum-
blebee is significantly more robust to noise than Nar, as
it achieves large-scale correct re-identification in cases
where other attacks could not rise above 1%. For seed-
ing, we found that only 1 − 2 seed nodes are enough
for successful attacks, significantly smaller compared
to previous works.
• We compare the performance of Bumblebee to other
modern de-anonymization attacks, and show that its
performance is the most outstanding compared to the
state-of-the-art, even against anonymized datasets as
well.
• We publish the source code of Bumblebee along our
framework called Structural Anonymity Lab (SALab).
Although we used earlier versions of it in our previ-
ous works, we now release SALab as an open source
framework that supports the experimental analysis of
re-identification attacks in social networks. It guaran-
tees the reproducibility of our results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
the related work, and in Section 3, we provide the method-
ology of our evaluation. Section 4 provides the details of
the Bumblebee algorithm, and in Section 5, we evaluate our
algorithm and compare it to other ones as well. Finally, in
Section 6, we conclude our work.
2. RELATEDWORK
Several attacks have followed Narayanan and Shmatikov
[19], and now we discuss the most relevant ones [5,13–15,18,
20,21,25,27]. These are heuristic approaches for solving the
de-anonymization problem as finding the optimal solution
is not computationally feasible [13]. The attacks may also
differ in many details, albeit they share some common prop-
erties. Generally, they consist of two sequentially executed
phases: one for initialization (seed phase with global node
comparison), and another that extends re-identification in
an iterative manner (propagation phase with local node com-
parison).
This is not a strict rule, some attacks run their propa-
gation phase for seed generation [13, 21], we call these self-
starting attacks. Other attacks need seeds to start, which
we call seed-based attacks [5, 14, 15, 18–20, 25, 27]. Another
important property of attacks is how they compare nodes.
Some attacks use simple node properties for measuring node
similarity [5, 15, 18, 19, 27], such as Nar uses cosine similar-
ity, while others require deeper structural properties [13,14,
21,25], like distance vector comparison where shortest path
distances are considered from already mapped nodes [25].
Narayanan et al. published also the first attack follow-
ing [19], that consisted of a simplified version of the original
attack [18]. Srivatsa and Hicks showed on small datasets
that location traces can be re-identified by matching them
to social networks [25], and other algorithms were proposed
to this problem by Ji et al. [14], verified on the same datasets.
Pham et al. proposed an algorithm that converts spatiotem-
poral data into a social network on large datasets [22]. Build-
ing upon their work, Ji et al. confirmed that location data
can be efficiently re-identified with social networks [11, 13].
Despite their original use, algorithms of [13, 14, 25] can also
be used on attacking regular social networks.
The algorithm designed by Nilizadeh et al. uses other at-
tacks as a base algorithm, and it exploits the cluster-oriented
structure of the networks: runs the base re-identification al-
gorithm first on the cluster structure, then inside them [20].
In their evaluation they used the Nar algorithm. Pedarsani
et al. proposed the first self-starting attack that required no
seeding [21]. The works of Yartseva and Grossglauser [27],
and the paper of Korula and Lattenzi [15] contain simplified
de-anonymization attacks in order to enable formal analy-
sis of the algorithms. In our previous work we proposed
Grasshopper [5] (also referred to as Grh), a robust attack
algorithm that works with very small error rates (typically
less then 1%).
The first comparative evaluation of several structural de-
anonymization attacks were first provided in [12]. Seven
algorithms in [13–15, 19, 21, 25, 27] were selected based on
generality, scalability and practicality, were compared re-
garding robustness of background knowledge and against
anonymization. Ji et al found that some algorithms were
the most prominent only conditionally; they concluded that
none of the evaluated algorithms could be considered as
generally better than others. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we neither know about previously published attacks
that have been proven to be better in general than the Nar
algorithm. Thus, we considered the Nar algorithm as the
baseline attack in our work, and we included Grasshopper
also, as this attack has appealing properties, like fairly high
re-identification rates in general with error rates almost at
zero [5]. However, we also provide comparison based on our
own measurements against results published in [12].
To the extent of our knowledge, the only structural re-
identification framework that is similar to SALab, is Sec-
Graph [12]. The benefit of SecGraph is that it implements
several re-identification, anonymization and utility algorithms.
Unfortunately, it does not implement several important func-
tions that are necessary for large-scale experimentation, such
as synthetic dataset perturbation (e.g., as in [19]), seed gen-
eration algorithms, and detailed evaluation of results (e.g.,
saving every minute detail while attacks are executed). SALab
had these functions and attacks implemented already, as pre-
vious versions of it has been used in multiple works: for
the analysis of the importance of seeding [9], for measuring
anonymity [7,10], for evaluating the Grasshopper attack [5],
and for analyzing numerous settings for adopting identity
separation for protecting privacy [6,8,10]. Therefore we de-
cided to choose SALab as our main tool.
3. NOTATION AND METHODOLOGY
We use the following notations in our work. Given an
anonymized graph Gtar = (Vtar, Etar) (target graph) to be
de-anonymized by using an auxiliary data source Gsrc =
(Vsrc, Esrc) (where node identities are known), let V˜src ⊆
Vsrc, V˜tar ⊆ Vtar denote the set of nodes mutually existing
in both. Ground truth is represented by the mapping µG :
V˜src → V˜tar denoting the relationship between coexisting
nodes. Running a deterministic re-identification attack on
(Gsrc, Gtar) initialized by a seed set µ0 : V
µ0
src → V µ0tar results
in a re-identification mapping denoted as µ : V µsrc → V µtar.
Nodes are denoted as vi, its set of immediate neighbors are
denoted as Vi ⊆ V , and its neighbors of neighbors are de-
noted as V 2i ⊆ V .
In our work, we use simple measures for assessing the ex-
tent of what the attacker could learn from µ. The recall
rate reflects the ratio of correct re-identifications: it is the
number of correct re-identifications divided by the number
of mutually existing nodes (V˜ ). The error rate is the pro-
portion of incorrectly re-identified nodes compared to V˜ ;
however, as there might be erroneous mapping outside V˜ ,
this leaves the possibility of the error rate to emerge above
100%. We also use precision, which is the proportion of
recall divided by the mapping size (|µ|).
Data preparation and simulation parameters are key parts
of methodology. We used multiple, large datasets with dif-
ferent characteristics in order to avoid related biases. We
obtained two datasets from the SNAP collection [3], namely
the Slashdot network (82k nodes, 504k edges) and the Epin-
ions network (75k nodes, 405k edges). The third dataset is a
subgraph exported from the LiveJournal network crawled in
2010 by us (66k nodes, 619k edges). Datasets were obtained
from real networks which assures that our measurements
were being realistic.
We used the perturbation strategy proposed by Narayanan
and Shmatikov [19] to generate synthetic graph pairs for our
experiments. Their method only uses deletion, thus the orig-
inal graph acts as a ground truth between Gsrc, Gtar. Their
algorithm makes two copies of the initial graph asGsrc, Gtar,
then performs independent deletions of nodes to achieve the
desired fraction of overlap (denoted as αv), and then deletes
edges independently to set the size of overlapping edges (to
αe). Overlap parameters αv, αe are measured by the Jac-
card similarity1. These parameters control the level of noise
in the data, therefore they are also a representation of the
strength of anonymization and the quality of the adversarial
background knowledge. Unless noted otherwise, we used the
setting of αv = 0.5, αe = 0.75, where a significant level of
uncertainty is present in the data and thus harder to attack.
The default simulation settings were set as follows. In
each experiment we created two random perturbations, and
run simulations once, as algorithms provided deterministic
results when we used the same seed set (e.g., see top be-
low). When seeding was random, we run the attacks multi-
ple times. Nar and Grh both have an important parameter
Θ that controls the ratio of correct and incorrect matches
(greediness): the lower Θ is the less accurate mappings the
algorithm will accept. As we measured fairly low error rates
even for small values of Θ, we have chosen to work with
Θ = 0.01 for both algorithms.
The seeding method and size have been showed to have a
strong effect on the overall outcome of de-anonymization [9].
In [9] we provided details for various methods, and high-
lighted seeding methods that were top performers on large
networks, regardless of the network structure, e.g., nodes
with the highest degree and betweenness centrality scores.
Considering these results, we applied two seeding methods.
Our prime choice was selecting an initial mapping between
top degree nodes (denoted as top), as this method proved to
be the most effective in previous measurements in terms of
run-time and smallest seed set size [9]. It can also be used
in real attacks, as a weighted graph matching technique has
been proposed for top seeding in [18]. Seed sizes were typ-
ically 50 − 200 for top. In some cases, we also considered
random seed selection with high degree nodes, where nodes
are selected from the top 1% by degree (denoted as ran-
dom.01).
1JaccSim(U, V ) = |U∩V ||U∪V | .
4. THE BUMBLEBEE ATTACK
4.1 The Motivation
Biases of the similarity measure of Nar and Grh, such as
we discussed in the introduction, motivated the invention
of the Bumblebee attack (Blb). We now illustrate these
biases and the new scoring function we propose on the source
node vi ∈ Vsrc and possible mapping candidates denoted as
vj ∈ Vtar. The similarity measure in Nar is a simplification
of the cosine similarity [19] as
NarSim(vi, vj) =
|Vi ∩ Vj |√|Vj | , (1)
where only a division with
√|Vi| is omitted, as this would
be constant while comparing vi to any other nodes (n.b.
|Vi ∩ Vj | is the number of common mapped neighbors). Un-
fortunately (1) shows biases towards low degree nodes when
the degree of vi, vj differ significantly.
We demonstrate this on the example as shown in Fig. 2a.
Here, we assume a situation where each algorithm has to
make a decision, having two nodes, namely vA, vB , to find
the correct mapping for. We assume a significant difference
in node degrees, having deg(vA) = deg(vA′) = 100, and
deg(vB) = deg(vB′) = 2, and also have 5 mappings already
existing in µ of which 2 overlap. Given this situation, we
calculated similarities and the resulting decisions, see it in
Fig. 2b. As NarSim penalizes high degree nodes, the re-
identification algorithm cannot re-identify vA.
The Grasshopper algorithm uses a similarity measure that
weights mappings [5]:
GrhSim(vi, vj) =
∑
∀(v′,v′′)∈{Vi∩Vj}
where µ(v′)=v′′
ω[v′]
=
∑
∀(v′,v′′)∈{Vi∩Vj}
where µ(v′)=v′′
(
|V ′ ∩ V ′′|√|V ′| · |V ′′| + 1
) (2)
where ω is the weight of each mapping in µ. Both ω, µ
are updated at the end of every iteration. This measure
is biased towards high degree nodes as the sum increases
faster with a higher number of connections rather than hav-
ing a smaller number of high degree adjacent nodes. Thus,
GrhSim cannot discover node vB as we demonstrate this
with the similarity matrix shown in Fig. 2c (all weights are
equal: ∀ωi = 1).
This leads to the need of a measure which yields higher
values when degree values are similar. We propose the fol-
lowing similarity measure to remedy the situation:
BlbSim(vi, vj) =
∣∣∣∣Vi ∩ Vj∣∣∣∣ · (min( |Vi||Vj | , |Vj ||Vi|
))δ
, (3)
where δ is a parameter that can be chosen freely as δ ∈
[0, 1]. This similarity measure is more balanced than the
previous ones when node degrees differ, as it is symmetric
and yields higher score when node degrees are closer to each
other. BlbSim can correctly re-identify both vA and vB as
in Fig. 2d.
4.2 Evaluation of BlbSim
Let us now evaluate if BlbSim is in fact better than Nar-
Sim, and if so, under what conditions. When two nodes are
compared with the discussed similarity metrics, we use the
already discovered mappings in µ to glue the source and tar-
get networks together. Here, by using the mappings as addi-
tional edges, vi ∈ Vsrc and all possible candidates vj ∈ Vtar
are reckoned as neighbors of neighbors in the same graph. In
this setting, we assume that if nodes vi and vj correspond to
each other (∃µG(vi) = vj) then vi, vj should be structurally
similar (to some extent). An appropriate similarity measure
S(·) should yield the highest score for S(vi, vj) than for all
other possible candidates. We can also describe this with
the following correct re-identification decision criteria:
S(vi, vj) > S(vi, v
′
j) + Θ, (4)
where vi ∈ Vsrc, vj , v′j ∈ Vtar, vj 6= v′j . The ratio between
correct and false decisions depend on the value chosen for
Θ ∈ [0,∞).
Due to the way existing mappings are used, this is simi-
lar to the problem when we compare two nodes in the same
graph vA, vB ∈ V . As we expected correct decisions in case
of re-identification (eq. (4)), we expect the similarity mea-
sure S(·) to give higher score for vA to itself, then of any
other node vB ∈ V \ {vA}, which is written as
S(vA, vA) > S(vA, vB) + Θ (5)
Let us call this the graph node structural comparison prob-
lem.
Theorem 1. Given the graph node structural comparison
problem, having Θ = 0 and δ ≥ 1/2, BlbSim(·) leads to a
higher number of correct decisions than NarSim(·).
We provide the proof for this theorem in the Appendix.
While we restricted ourselves to some parameter settings in
Theorem 1, later we show with experiments that Θ and δ
parameters can be used together to achieve settings where
the attack will exhibit interesting properties, e.g., providing
high recalls or having extremely low error rates. Further-
more, as the scoring schemes output a different distribution,
for BlbSim parameter Θ gives a significantly richer control
of greediness (cf. in Fig. 6b).
4.3 Attack Description
We now discuss how the complete attack works based on
BlbSim, for which we provide the pseudocode as in Algo. 1
and 2. After obtaining the seed set (µ0), the attack starts
by iteratively calling Propagate, and it stops when no new
mappings can be registered (when ∆ = 0). In each propa-
gation step all nodes in Vsrc are checked for new mappings.
Existing mappings are visited again, as this allows correc-
tion after discovering more mappings. Then we calculate the
BlbSim between vsrc and all possible candidates in Score
by using δ (Algo. 1 line 3). Score selects candidates by it-
erating unmapped neighbors of neighbors through µ (Algo.
2 lines 2-7).
If there is an outstanding candidate vc (Algo. 1 line 4),
we do a reverse checking to decrease false positives. We test
if we swap the graphs and invert the mapping, would vsrc
be the best candidate for vc (Algo. 1 lines 8-12). If it is, we
Source graph Target graph
A
B
2
4
1
3
5
A'
B'
2'
4'
1'
3'
5'
... ...
(a) Here, deg(vA) = deg(vA′ ) = 100, and deg(vB) = deg(vB′ ) = 2 and 5 mappings
already exist in µ.
NarSim A′ B′ ?
A 5√
100
2√
2
B′
B 2√
100
2√
2
B′
(b) NarSim decisions
GrhSim A′ B′ ?
A 5 2 A′
B 2 2 N/A
(c) GrhSim decisions with ∀ωi = 1 (ωi ∈
ω)
BlbSim A′ B′ ?
A 5 0.89 A′
B 0.89 2 B′
(d) BlbSim decisions with δ = 0.5
Figure 2: Example for demonstrating biases in the similarity measures.
Algorithm 1: Propagate
Data: Gsrc, Gtar, µ
Result: µ,∆
1 ∆← 0;
2 for vsrc ∈ Vsrc do
3 S ← Score(Gsrc, Gtar, vsrc, µ);
4 if Ecc(S.values()) < Θ then
5 continue;
6 end
7 vc ← Random(Max(S));
8 Sr ← Score(Gtar, Gsrc, vc, µ−1);
9 if Ecc(Sr.values()) < Θ then
10 continue;
11 end
12 vrc ← Random(Max(Sr));
13 if vsrc = vrc then
14 µ[vsrc]← vc;
15 ∆← ∆ + 1;
16 end
17 end
Algorithm 2: Score
Data: Gsrc, Gtar, vsrc, µ
Result: S
1 S ← Dict(∀v ∈ Vtar : v → 0);
2 for vi ∈ Gsrc.nbrs(vsrc) do
3 if @µ(vi) then
4 continue;
5 end
6 for vj ∈ Gtar.nbrs(µ(vi)) do
7 if ∃µ−1(vj) then
8 continue;
9 end
10 r1 = deg(vsrc)/deg(vj);
11 r2 = deg(vj)/deg(vsrc);
12 S[vj ]← S[vj ] + (min(r1, r2))δ;
13 end
14 end
register the new mapping and indicate convergence (Algo. 1
lines 14, 15). We say that a node with maximum score in S
is outstanding if its similarity score is higher than all others
at least by Θ:
Ecc(S) =
max(S)−max(S \ {max(S)})
σ(S)
≥ Θ. (6)
An off-the-shelf working version of this attack is available
in SALab. Bumblebee inherited some parts of Nar which we
found to be natural and good design choices, such as can-
didate selection through mappings and reverse checking to
eliminate false positives. However, we use a greedy conver-
gence criteria triggered by even the smallest changes (Algo.
1 line 15), and we redesigned the scoring function (Score)
for eliminating biases. Albeit we use the same eccentricity
function as Nar, due to the wider scoring diversity of Blb-
Sim, this plays a more important role in Blb, and allows a
more fine-grained control of the algorithm (cf. in Fig. 6b).
5. EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the Bumblebee algorithm, and
compare it to other attacks. Although we use multiple set-
tings of Bumlbebee, parameters Θ and δ do remain free to
choose. Best settings may depend on several factors, such
as the size and structure of the dataset under analysis. We
use the notation as Blb(δ) (when Θ is fixed) or as Blb(Θ, δ).
As we discussed before, we use SALab which enables ana-
lyzing various aspects of large-scale structural attacks. We
also make it available at https://github.com/gaborgulyas/
salab; we hope it will contribute to further research helping
to have a better understanding of structural anonymity.
Our simulations were run on a commodity computer with
an Intel Xeon 3.6 GHz processor and 8 GB RAM.
5.1 Experimental Analysis of δ and Θ
First we evaluate how parameters δ and Θ influence the
overall outcome. We used top seeding with 200 nodes and
Θ = 0.01, meaning a greedy setting in case of Nar [19] and
Grh [5] (we provide analysis of Θ for Bumblebee later), safe
enough for all algorithms to provide high recall rates [5,
9]. Results for a wide range of δ values in the Slashdot
Figure 3: Effect of the δ parameter on results (Slashdot
dataset).
Figure 4: Effect of the Θ parameter for different algorithms
in the LiveJournal dataset.
dataset are visible in Fig. 3. Due to space limitations, we
select results of one network for demonstration; however,
until noted otherwise, we were getting similar results in the
other networks as well.
Interestingly, we observed transition phases of the recall
and error rates as a function of δ, which divided results
into three interesting parameter subclasses for Blb. We used
these classes for analyzing parameter Θ. In the first class
(denoted with 1 ) we observed lower recall rates and low
error. We use such a setting as δ = 0 and denote it as
Blb(0). This conservative setting makes decisions only based
on the number of common mappings without considering
any other information. Another classes are where the recall
rates plateau after increasing significantly ( 2 ). Here we
selected two settings, one when recall peaked but error is
relatively low, and the other when the error is also peaked
( 3 ). We observed that the recall rate usually at its highest
at δ = 0.005 while error rate is still lower, thus we selected
Blb(.005), and finally we selected Blb(.5) also.
We provide comparison on the effect of the Θ parameter
for the LiveJournal dataset in Fig. 4. What clearly stands
out from these results, that Blb could achieve the highest
recall rates, while it also had higher errors for the same
Θ settings compared to Nar and Grh. Furthermore, the
conservative setting of Blb(0) managed to achieve higher
recall than Grh with similarly low error, and in most cases
higher recall as Nar, but with a lower error rate. Another
interesting property of Bumblebee is that it achieved high
recall rates as Nar with extremely low error, e.g., Blb(Θ =
4.0, δ = 0.5) recall = 29.91%, error = 0.15%; in other cases it
achieved a significantly better trade-off between recall-error
rates, as the error/recall results suggest. Comparing the
recall-error results additionally shows that results provided
by Grh, Blb(0) are subclasses of the results of Blb(.5). The
only difference is they provide the same (recall, error) results
at different values of Θ. Finally, Blb(.005) is clearly worse
than Blb(.5).
From these results, we conclude that both parameters of
Bumblebee enable the control of greediness in the algorithm
by taking values as Θ ∈ [0, . . . ,∞), δ ∈ (0, ..., 1]. Conserva-
tive (low error) settings are typically with high Θ and low δ,
greedy settings are with the opposite settings. In addition,
parameters can also be used compensate each other, like
as Blb(1, .5) provided high recall with low error in Fig. 4.
We used these measurements to set parameters for further
experiments.
5.2 Analysis of Seeding Sensitivity
The number of required seeds is an important aspect of
seed-based attacks, as these need to be provided before start-
ing propagation, or in another sense, before starting the at-
tack. Thus, the smaller the seed size is, the better. We
consider the minimum required number of seeds for which
the attack is stable: observed recall and error rates only vary
minimally and the recall rate reaches its maximum [9]. We
provide an example on the minimum number of seed nodes
with top in Fig. 5 on Epinions dataset. Beside getting better
recall and error rates than others, some Bumblebee variants
managed to start with only a single seed node.
In other networks 1-2 seed nodes were enough to achieve
large-scale re-identification with a higher error rate, which
dropped when the number of seeds reached 5-6. We observed
similar results when relaxing the seed criteria to random.01,
multiple successful seeding attempts with a single random
seed for Bumblebee. This means top 1% of high degree
nodes, random selection from approx. a set of 200-300 nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, these results are superior to
existing previous works, which reported minimum number
of seeds at 16 seed nodes [20], or 8 − 14 seed nodes [5].
In addition, relaxed seed criteria means easier attacks: one
randomly selected node from the top 1% as a seed is an
easily doable task for an attacker; even with some retries or
collecting a handful of seeds in order to achieve large-scale
propagation.
5.3 Robustness
The quality of the background knowledge, or the overlap
between Gsrc and Gtar, has a strong influence on the lim-
its of re-identification. For example, the Grh algorithm has
typically higher recall rates than Nar when the overlap is
smaller [5]. In order to investigate such biases, we measured
the performances of the algorithms with different pertur-
bation settings. We note that almost all overlaps in these
measurements are significantly lower than in experiments of
Section 5.4.
We provide results in the Epinions network in Fig. 6a.
A greedy setting of Bumblebee, Blb(.5, .5) had the highest
recall rates in all cases, with an acceptable level of error ex-
cept in two settings. A more conservative setting, Blb(.01, 0)
Figure 5: Seed sizes of top and random.01 required for large-scale re-identification (Epinions dataset).
(a) Performances for different perturbation
settings. (overlap values are as actually
measured, not as set for perturbation)
(b) Different Θ val-
ues used on αv =
0.28, αe = 0.09 set-
ting.
Figure 6: Robustness comparison of different algorithms
(Epinions dataset); recall and error rates for different per-
turbation settings.
provided recall rates close to Nar (and higher to Grh), but
with negligible error.
In experiments with small overlap, error rates of Blb(.5, .5)
were higher in case of all three networks and while staying
low for Nar (as of no propagation); for Blb it reached 12%
in case of Epinions. These cases were with perturbation
settings αv = 0.25, αe = 0.75 and αv = 0.5, αe = 0.25.
However, these are the perturbation parameters, not actual
values: deleting nodes delete some edges and removing edges
sometime totally disconnect nodes. Therefore we displayed
the actual overlaps on the x-axis in Fig. 6a, which are mea-
sured with the Jaccard similarity [19]. In these special cases
the background knowledge and anonymized networks shared
typically ≤ 10% of overlapping edges in all three networks.
In case of αv = 0.28, αe = 0.09 only Blb(.5, .5) could
achieve large-scale propagation, but with high error. This
can be decreased by setting parameters δ or Θ. With the
latter, we could achieve recall = 12.7% with an error only at
5.1% (Θ = 1.0), or recall = 7.6%, error = 1.1% (Θ = 2.0);
see more details in Fig. 6b.
We furthermore note that Fig. 6b also provides evidence
that parameter Θ allows significantly more fine-grained con-
trol in Bumblebee than in the Nar algorithm. Fig. 6b is also
an example how one can search the parameter space for the
desired trade-off between recall and error by fixing one of
the parameters.
5.4 Comparison with Other Attack Algorithms
We can now compare the performance of the Bumblebee
algorithm with other modern attacks. As [12] provides a
recent selection and comparison of efficient structural so-
cial network de-anonymization attacks, we compare Bum-
blebee to these attacks under the same settings. The source
code of the attacks are released with the SecGraph tool [2].
Therefore, we obtained the same datasets, the Enron [3] (36k
nodes, 183k edges) and Facebook [1] networks (63k nodes,
817k edges). With the sampling based perturbation method
(implemented in SALab) we recreated the datasets Gsrc, Gtar
as of [12]: we only needed to randomly sample edges with
probability s, while nodes were kept intact as much as possi-
ble. We note that this perturbation technique does notably
smaller damage to the data compared to how we created
synthetic datasets; for example, the lowest setting for En-
ron with s = 0.6 corresponds to αv = 0.77, αe = 0.42, or
Enron s = 0.95 corresponds to αv = 0.97, αe = 0.90 (cf.
x-axis in Fig. 6a).
According to the results of Table 6 in [12], we selected top
performing attacks for comparison. For brevity, we simply
provide the list of these attacks without details: percola-
tion graph matching (later referred as YG) [27], distance
vector matching (DV) [25], reconciliation attack (KL) [15].
We used 50 top seeding (as in [12]), and run the Nar and
Blb(.1, .5) attacks from SALab. We run the three other at-
tacks from the SecGraph implementation on the generated
datasets. As both frameworks output the final the mapping
µ, we could safely use this for our comparison.
We obtained results as in Fig. 7. For Nar and YG we ob-
tained almost identical results as in [12], while recall for DV
were consistently smaller, and for KL significantly higher.
The latter differences can be due to configurational settings
however, we tried several configurations to achieve best re-
Figure 7: Comparison of efficient de-anonymization algorithms. We used the same datasets, settings and code as in [12], based
on which we selected outstanding attacks in [15,25,27] to provide a comparison with Bumblebee.
sults for all attacks. Here, we observed that Bumblebee
provided a balanced, high performance in all settings, out-
performing all other attacks.
In [12] only recall rates are concerned for describing the
performance of de-anonymization attacks, while we found
that error rates divide attacks into two strongly separated
classes; we found that Nar, YG, Blb were high and DV, KL
were low precision attacks. This finding puts high recalls
into another perspective, as related error rates between 40-
100% are unacceptably high. Therefore, while the KL attack
had higher recall rates than Blb for Enron s = 0.95, with
the 43.9% error rate KL had a very poor precision, unlikely
to be acceptable for an attacker.
We also evaluated robustness of attacks against anonymiza-
tion schemes as a comparison of Bumblebee for results in
Table 8 in [12] (while keeping scheme parameters identical).
Again, for brevity, we only enlist the schemes we included:
random edge swithcing (Switch) [28], k-degree anonymiza-
tion (k-DA) [16], and a method providing differential pri-
vacy (DP) [23]. We left out a clustering approach due to
unreasonably long runtimes [26], and a random walk based
graph regeneration method [17] – against the latter we could
not achieve recall rates higher than 1% with any of the al-
gorithms.
Here, we first sampled the background knowledge network
from the original datasets with probability s, and obtained
the anonymized network by running the anonymization al-
gorithms also on the original datasets (no sampling). We
observed robustness of evaluated attacks as in Table 1. In
case of anonymization, Blb proved to be generally the most
robust attack, as it always achieved successful attacks with
the high recall rates compared to others with high precision.
It had error rates around 1-2%, exceptionally 5-6% only for
Enron, DP  = 50. The latter was exceptional as this was
the only case when another attack provided higher recall
than Bumblebee; however, KL provided very poor precision
with error rates between 61.7%-70.2%.
These results show that Bumblebee is generally a bal-
anced, robust, high performing attack with low error rates,
outstanding of the state-of-the-art. Beside, while Bumble-
bee had runtimes typically between 5-10mins in each case,
not all others were that fast, for example, KL had runtimes
between 12-24h.
5.5 Complexity and Runtime
Runtimes of Bumblebee depend mainly on the complex-
ity of propagation iterations and speed of convergence. The
complexity of the Bumblebee propagation phase is O(dsrc ·
dtar · (|Vsrc| + 1)), where dsrc, dtar denotes maximum de-
gree in each graph. The algorithm iterates over ∀v ∈ Vsrc.
We assume having mapping µ˜ when inspecting v, and the
algorithm selects the neighbors-of-neighbors of v. More pre-
cisely, neighbors are ∀v′ ∈ V ⊆ Vsrc having |V | ≤ dsrc,
and their neighbors are the neighbors of the mapped coun-
terparts of v, the neighbors of v′′ = µ˜(v′). Here V ′′ ⊆
Vtar is upper bounded as |V ′′| ≤ dtar. This leads us to
O(|Vsrc| · dsrc · dtar). We need to add the reverse check-
ing complexity (O(dtar · dsrc)) which leads us to the given
bound.
However, this does not necessarily captures the total run-
time, as it significantly depends on the speed on the con-
vergence, i.e., how fast the algorithm converges to its final
result in terms of the number of new re-identifications in
each propagation round [5, 6]. In addition, run-times need
to be handled with caution and these should be only com-
pared when Nar and Blb achieve high re-identification rates;
otherwise, significant differences could occur. For instance,
the number of propagation rounds could be less for the al-
gorithm that has lower recall as it finishes before.
In order to avoid such biases, we compared runtimes and
the number of propagation rounds where both algorithm
achieved very high recall rates both (see in Fig. 8a). We
found that Blb(.1, .5) converges faster in a lower number of
rounds compared to Nar, as its convergence profile is quite
different (cf. Fig. 8b and 8c). Blb re-identifies the majority
of nodes in the first propagation round and then converges
for some rounds, while Nar has a slower convergence. This
is also shown by the average number of propagation rounds,
Table 1: Robustness of attacks against different anonymization schemes from [16,23,28]. Values are recall rates [%] (denoted
as Rc) and precision [%] (Pr) of each algorithm under the given settings. Settings and parameters are intentionally replicating
results of [12] in order to enhance comparability of results.
s
Enron Facebook
Switch(k) k-DA (k) DP () Switch (k) k-DA (k) DP ()
5 10 5 50 300 50 5 10 5 50 300 50
Rc Pr Rc Pr Rc Pr Rc Pr Rc Pr Rc Pr Rc Pr Rc Pr Rc Pr Rc Pr Rc Pr Rc Pr
Nar
.85 34.9 94.3 0.5 89.9 39.1 98.2 1.0 94.6 38.2 98.0 0.5 97.3 89.1 96.6 82.8 93.6 94.0 98.9 93.8 98.8 93.5 98.6 87.1 95.8
.90 36.1 95.6 0.7 91.1 40.6 98.9 37.7 97.7 39.1 98.8 0.5 97.2 90.0 97.2 84.4 94.7 94.7 99.2 94.6 99.2 94.5 99.1 89.7 97.5
.95 37.0 96.5 30.3 94.8 41.0 99.2 38.6 98.7 40.2 99.4 0.6 98.9 91.2 97.9 85.6 95.6 95.5 99.7 95.4 99.7 95.2 99.6 91.0 98.5
YG
.85 13.6 90.0 11.2 86.3 16.8 94.7 1.3 24.4 15.5 92.0 9.7 76.2 51.9 97.8 47.5 96.4 55.7 99.0 48.8 92.1 54.1 98.3 45.7 89.8
.90 15.0 93.4 12.8 91.1 15.2 90.8 1.7 29.1 16.9 95.2 10.2 77.5 53.4 98.3 49.3 96.9 56.6 99.1 52.3 94.7 55.2 98.4 48.7 92.7
.95 16.4 94.9 13.8 92.1 17.4 95.0 4.8 55.1 18.2 96.7 9.7 75.8 54.7 98.8 51.2 98.2 57.9 99.4 54.3 95.9 56.1 98.3 48.4 91.5
DV
.85 13.2 13.2 8.2 8.2 13.2 13.2 4.0 4.0 13.8 13.7 0.3 0.3 17.7 17.7 9.3 9.3 25.5 25.5 5.6 5.6 18.3 18.3 8.7 8.7
.90 15.4 15.4 9.4 9.4 15.2 15.2 4.8 4.8 14.9 14.9 0.3 0.3 22.3 22.2 11.7 11.7 31.7 31.7 7.1 7.1 23.6 23.6 11.1 11.1
.95 19.2 19.2 11.8 11.8 19.6 19.6 5.8 5.8 17.8 17.7 0.3 0.3 32.1 32.1 16.9 16.9 47.6 47.6 12.2 12.1 39.4 39.4 12.4 12.4
KL
.85 28.7 28.7 26.6 26.6 29.9 29.9 20.5 20.5 30.1 30.1 29.8 29.8 66.0 66.0 63.0 63.0 67.1 67.1 66.4 66.4 67.0 67.0 73.2 73.2
.90 31.2 31.2 28.6 28.6 32.9 32.9 23.2 23.2 32.2 32.2 34.0 34.0 75.3 75.3 71.2 71.2 84.9 84.9 84.2 84.2 84.0 84.0 81.4 81.4
.95 37.0 37.0 35.0 35.0 38.2 38.2 32.4 32.4 36.5 36.5 38.3 38.3 94.4 94.4 91.6 91.6 97.2 97.2 96.4 96.4 97.0 97.0 79.8 79.8
Blb
.85 42.5 93.5 38.9 90.8 45.2 97.3 42.8 94.5 43.8 96.1 27.8 80.3 92.1 98.5 88.2 97.3 94.8 99.2 94.4 98.9 94.5 99.1 89.2 97.0
.90 44.2 95.7 39.9 93.2 46.4 98.3 44.8 96.7 45.5 97.5 29.0 83.3 93.2 99.1 89.9 98.4 95.4 99.6 95.3 99.5 95.3 99.6 91.2 98.2
.95 45.1 97.5 41.2 96.3 47.3 99.3 46.1 98.5 46.4 98.8 32.0 84.7 93.8 99.6 91.0 99.2 96.0 99.9 95.9 99.9 95.8 99.8 91.9 98.5
(a) Number of propagation rounds and
related runtimes.
(b) Re-identification convergence of Nar
over degree classes.
(c) Re-identification convergence of
Blb(0.1, 0.5) over degree classes.
Figure 8: Blb converges faster in a lower number of rounds compared to Nar.
which was 11.5 for Nar and 8.3 for Blb, while each round
turned to be longer for Blb. The average final runtimes were
tBlb = 311 secs and tNar = 263 secs, which are notable, but
not dramatic differences.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered structural social network de-
anonymization attacks, where we argued that node similar-
ity metric plays a critical part. In fact, in order to improve
that critical step, we proposed a new metric designed specif-
ically for social networks, which we incorporated our new
attack called Bumblebee.
We evaluated the new attack in different real-life networks
and under multiple settings. We showed that Bumblebee
outperforms the baseline attack in multiple aspects, as it is
robust to noise and when attacker background knowledge
is weak. We have also shown improvement in the minimum
required size of seed sets, achieved high recall rates. Bumble-
bee allows a fine-grained control over the trade-off between
yield and error; which either allows fixing error rates for
reaching higher recall than other attacks, or decreasing the
level of error.
We have also compared Bumblebee to the other state-of-
the-art attacks, and found that Bumblebee was highly effi-
cient under all circumstances, even against different anonymiza-
tion schemes. Reaching high recall with high accuracy in all
cases, with balanced performance against noise and anonymiza-
tion attempts make Bumblebee the most outstanding attack
within the state-of-the-art.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF FOR THEOREM 1
Proof. We expect that equation (5) will hold for Nar-
Sim. Substituting equation (1) into (5):
|VA|√|VA| > |VA ∩ VB |√|VB | (7)
Similarly with (3), we get the following for BlbSim:
|VA| > |VA ∩ VB | ·
(
min
( |VA|
|VB | ,
|VB |
|VA|
))δ
(8)
We can rearrange these equations to the following form:
|VA|
|VA ∩ VB | >
√|VA|√|VB | and |VA||VA ∩ VB | >
(
min
( |VA|
|VB | ,
|VB |
|VA|
))δ
.
(9)
If NarSim scores give an upper-bound to BlbSim, then
BlbSim will meet the criteria in (5) for more cases. This
means that BlbSim would make more correct similarity com-
parisons than NarSim.
We can write the upper-bound criteria as
(
min
( |VA|
|VB | ,
|VB |
|VA|
))δ
≤
√|VA|√|VB | . (10)
This finally boils down to the following cases.
1. |VA| = |VB |: Here, (10) reduces to an an equality that
holds for all values of δ.
2. |VA| > |VB |: We will get the following inequality
(|VB |)δ
(|VA|)δ ≤
√|VA|√|VB | , (11)
where the left hand side is < 1, while the right hand side
is > 1, thus equation (10) holds for all values of δ.
3. |VA| < |VB |: Similarly, we will get:
(|VA|)δ
(|VB |)δ ≤
√|VA|√|VB | , rearranged as
( |VA|
|VB |
)δ−1/2
≤ 1. (12)
Here, for δ < 1/2, due to the negative exponent the left
hand side will be > 1, while for δ ≥ 1/2 the left hand side
will be ≤ 1.
This means, that equation (10) holds for all three cases
when δ ≥ 1/2, which gets us to the statement of the Theo-
rem.
